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March 2023 Continental Europe

Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines

State Street Global Advisors' Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelinesⁱ for Continental Europe outline our approach to voting and engaging with companies listed on stock exchanges in European markets, excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland. These Guidelines complement and should be read in conjunction with State Street Global Advisors' Global Proxy Voting and Engagement Principles, which outline our overall approach to voting and engaging with companies, and State Street Global Advisors' Conflicts Mitigation Guidelines, which provide information about managing the conflicts of interests that may arise through State Street Global Advisors' proxy voting and engagement activities.

i These Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines (the "Guidelines") are also applicable to SSGA Funds Management, Inc., State Street Global Advisors Trust Company, and other advisory affiliates of State Street Corporation. Additionally, State Street Global Advisors maintains Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines for select markets, including: Australia, continental Europe, Japan, New Zealand, North America (Canada and the US), the UK and Ireland, and emerging markets. International markets not covered by our market-specific guidelines are reviewed and voted in a manner that is consistent with the Global Proxy Voting and Engagement Principles; however, State Street Global Advisors also endeavors to show sensitivity to local market practices when voting in these various markets.

State Street Global Advisors' Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines for Continental Europe address our market-specific approaches to topics including directors and boards, accounting and audit-related issues, capital structure, reorganization and mergers, remuneration, and other governance-related issues.

When voting and engaging with companies in European markets, we consider market-specific nuances in the manner that we believe will most likely protect and promote the long-term economic value of client investments. We expect companies to observe the relevant laws and regulations of their respective markets, as well as country-specific best practice guidelines and corporate governance codes. We may hold companies in some markets to our global standards when we feel that a country's regulatory requirements do not address some of the key philosophical principles that we believe are fundamental to our global voting principles.

In our analysis and research into corporate governance issues at European companies, we expect all companies at a minimum to comply with guidance issued by the European Commission and country-specific governance codes. Consistent with the "comply-or-explain" expectations commonly established by guidance and codes, we encourage companies to proactively disclose their level of compliance with applicable provisions and requirements. In cases of non-compliance, and when companies cannot explain the nuances of their governance structures effectively, either publicly or through engagement, we may vote against the independent board leader.

State Street
Global Advisors'
Proxy Voting and
Engagement Philosophy

In our view, corporate governance and sustainability issues are an integral part of the investment process. The Asset Stewardship Team consists of investment professionals with expertise in corporate governance, remuneration, accounting, and environmental and social issues. We have established robust corporate governance principles and practices that are backed with extensive analytical expertise in order to understand the complexities of the corporate governance landscape. We engage with companies to provide insight on the principles and practices that drive our voting decisions. We also conduct proactive engagements to address significant shareholder concerns and issues in a manner consistent with maximizing shareholder value.

The team works alongside members of State Street Global Advisors' Active Fundamental and Europe, Middle East and Africa ("EMEA") investment teams, collaborating on issuer engagements and providing input on company-specific fundamentals.

Directors and Boards

Principally, a board acts on behalf of shareholders by protecting their interests and preserving their rights. In order to carry out their primary responsibilities, directors have to undertake activities that range from setting strategy and providing guidance on strategic matters, overseeing executive management, to selecting the CEO and other senior executives, creating a succession plan for the board and management, and providing effective risk oversight, including of risks related to sustainability issues. Further, we believe good corporate governance necessitates the existence of effective internal controls and risk management systems, which should be governed by the board.

We believe that a well-constituted board of directors with a balance of skills, expertise and independence, provides the foundations for a well-governed company. We view board quality as a measure of director independence, director succession planning, board diversity, evaluations and refreshment, and company governance practices. We vote for the (re-)election of directors on a case-by-case basis after considering various factors, including board quality, general market practice, and availability of information on director skills and expertise.

In our analysis of boards, we consider whether board members have adequate skills to provide effective oversight of corporate strategy, operations, and risks, including environmental and social issues. Boards should also have a regular evaluation process in place to assess the effectiveness of the board and the skills of board members to address issues such as emerging risks, changes to corporate strategy, and diversification of operations and geographic footprint.

We may also consider factors such as board performance and directors who appear to be remiss in the performance of their oversight responsibilities (e.g. fraud, criminal wrongdoing and/or breach of fiduciary responsibilities).

Board Independence

In principle, we believe independent directors are crucial to robust corporate governance and help management establish sound corporate governance policies and practices. We believe a sufficiently independent board will most effectively monitor management and perform oversight functions necessary to protect shareholder interests.

Our broad criteria for director independence in European companies include factors such as:

- · Participation in related-party transactions and other business relations with the company
- Employment history with the company
- Relations with controlling shareholders
- Family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or senior employees
- · Serving as an employee or government representative
- Overall average board tenure and individual director tenure at issuers with classified and de-classified boards, respectively, and
- Company classification of a director as non-independent

While overall board independence requirements and board structures differ from market to market, we consider voting against directors we deem non-independent if overall board independence is below 33 percent or if overall independence level is below 50 percent after excluding employee representatives and/or directors elected in accordance with local laws who are not elected by shareholders. We may withhold support for a proposal to discharge the board if a company does not meet adequate governance standards or board level independence.

Separation Chair/CEO

We also assess the division of responsibilities between chair and CEO on a case-by-case basis, giving consideration to factors such as overall level of independence on the board and general corporate governance standards in the company. However, we may take voting action against the chair or members of the nominating committee at the STOXX Europe 600 companies that have combined the roles of chair and CEO and have not appointed an independent deputy chair or a lead independent director.

Director Time Commitments

When voting on the election or re-election of a director, we also consider the number of outside board directorships a non-executive and an executive may undertake. Thus, State Street Global Advisors may take voting action against a director who exceeds the number of board mandates listed below:

- Named Executive Officers (NEOs) of a public company who sit on more than two public company boards
- Non-executive board chairs or lead independent directors who sit on more than three public company boards
- Director nominees who sit on more than four public company boards

For non-executive board chairs/lead independent directors and director nominees who hold excessive commitments, as defined above, we may consider waiving our policy and vote in support of a director if a company discloses its director commitment policy in a publicly available manner (e.g., corporate governance guidelines, proxy statement, company website). This policy or associated disclosure must include:

- A numerical limit on public company board seats a director can serve on
 - This limit cannot exceed our policy by more than one seat
- · Consideration of public company board leadership positions (e.g., Committee Chair)
- Affirmation that all directors are currently compliant with the company policy
- Description of an annual policy review process undertaken by the Nominating Committee to evaluate outside director time commitments

If a director is imminently leaving a board and this departure is disclosed in a written, time-bound and publicly-available manner, we may consider waiving our withhold vote when evaluating the director for excessive time commitments.

Service on a mutual fund board, the board of a UK investment trust or a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) board is not considered when evaluating directors for excessive commitments. However, we do expect these roles to be considered by nominating committees when evaluating director time commitments.

Director Attendance at Board Meetings

We also consider attendance at board meetings and may withhold votes from directors who attend less than 75 percent of board meetings without appropriate explanation or providing reason for their failure to meet the attendance threshold. In addition, we monitor other factors that may influence the independence of a non-executive director, such as performance-related pay, cross-directorships and significant shareholdings. Moreover, we may vote against the election of a director whose biographical disclosures are insufficient to assess his or her role on the board and/or independence.

Board Gender Diversity

We expect boards of all listed companies to have at least one female board member and the boards of STOXX 600 companies to be composed of at least 30 percent women directors. If a company does not meet the applicable expectation, State Street Global Advisors may vote against the Chair of the board's nominating committee or the board leader in the absence of a nominating committee. Additionally, if a company does not meet the applicable expectation for three consecutive years, State Street Global Advisors may vote against all incumbent members of the nominating committee or those persons deemed responsible for the nomination process.

We may waive this voting guideline if a company engages with State Street Global Advisors and provides a specific, timebound plan for either reaching the 30-percent threshold (STOXX 600) or for adding a woman director (non-STOXX 600).

Length of Board Terms

Although we generally are in favour of the annual election of directors, we recognise that director terms vary considerably in different European markets. We may vote against article/bylaw changes that seek to extend director terms. In addition, we may vote against directors in certain markets if their terms extend beyond four years.

Board Committees

We believe companies should have relevant board level committees for audit, remuneration and nomination oversight. The audit committee is responsible for monitoring the integrity of the financial statements of the company, appointing external auditors, monitoring their qualifications and independence, and assessing effectiveness and resource levels. Similarly, executive pay is an important aspect of corporate governance, and it should be determined by the board of directors. We expect companies to have remuneration committees to provide independent oversight of executive pay. We may vote against nominees who are executive members of audit or remuneration committees.

In certain European markets, it is not uncommon for the election of directors to be presented in a single slate. In these cases, where executives serve on the audit or the remuneration committees, we may vote against the entire slate.

Board Responsiveness to High Dissent Against Pay Proposals Poorly-structured executive remuneration plans pose increasing reputational risk to companies. Ongoing high levels of dissent against a company's remuneration proposals may indicate that the company is not receptive to investor concerns. If the level of dissent against a company's remuneration report and/or remuneration policy is consistently high, and we have determined that a vote against a remuneration-related proposal is warranted in the third consecutive year, we may vote against the Chair of the remuneration committee.

Climate-related Disclosure

State Street Global Advisors finds that the recommendations of the Task Force on Climaterelated Financial Disclosures (TCFD) provide the most effective framework for disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities.

As such, we may take voting action against companies in the STOXX 600 that fail to provide sufficient disclosure regarding climate-related risks and opportunities related to that company, or board oversight of climate-related risks and opportunities, in accordance with the TCFD framework.

Indemnification and Limitations on Liability

Generally, we support proposals to limit directors' liability and/or expand indemnification and liability protection up to the limit provided by law if a director has not acted in bad faith, with gross negligence, or with reckless disregard of the duties involved in the conduct of his or her office.

Shareholder Rights

Virtual/Hybrid Shareholder Meetings

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, companies are increasingly conducting their shareholder meetings in a virtual or hybrid format. While we are encouraged by the success of virtual and hybrid shareholder meetings, companies and shareholders must remain vigilant in continuing to improve their virtual shareholder meeting practices.

Recognizing the success of virtual and hybrid shareholder meetings and a shifting regulatory environment, we will generally support proposals that grant boards the right to hold shareholder meetings in a virtual or hybrid format as long as companies uphold the following best practices:

- Afford virtual attendee shareholders the same rights as would normally be granted to in-person attendee shareholders
- Commit to time-bound renewal (five years or less) of meeting format authorization by shareholders
- · Provide a written record of all questions posed during the meeting, and
- Comply with local market laws and regulations relating to virtual and hybrid shareholder meeting practices

If a company breaches of any of the criteria above, we may vote against the Chair of the nominating committee.

Accounting and Audit-Related Issues

Companies should have robust internal audit and internal control systems designed for effective management of any potential and emerging risks to company operations and strategy. The responsibility of setting up an internal audit function lies with the audit committee, which should have as members independent non-executive directors.

Appointment of External Auditors

We believe that a company's auditor is an essential feature of an effective and transparent system of external supervision. Shareholders should be given the opportunity to vote on their appointment or re-appoint them at the annual meeting. When appointing external auditors and approving audit fees, we consider the level of detail in company disclosures; we will generally not support such resolutions if adequate breakdown is not provided and if non-audit fees are more than 50 percent of audit fees. In addition, we may vote against members of the audit committee if we have concerns with audit-related issues or if the level of non-audit fees to audit fees is significant. We may consider auditor tenure when evaluating the audit process in certain circumstances.

Limit Legal Liability of External Auditors

We generally oppose limiting the legal liability of audit firms as we believe this could create a negative impact on the quality of the audit function.

Approval of Financial Statements

We believe the disclosure and availability of reliable financial statements in a timely manner is imperative for the investment process. We expect external auditors to provide assurance of a company's financial condition. Hence, we may vote against the approval of financial statements if i) they have not been disclosed or audited; ii) the auditor opinion is qualified/adverse, or the auditor has issued a disclaimer of opinion; or iii) the auditor opinion is not disclosed.

Capital Structure, Reorganization, and Mergers In some European markets, differential voting rights continue to exist. State Street Global Advisors supports the one-share, one-vote policy and favors a share structure where all shares have equal voting rights. We believe pre-emption rights should be introduced for shareholders in order to provide adequate protection from excessive dilution from the issuance of new shares or convertible securities to third parties or a small number of select shareholders.

Unequal Voting Rights

We generally oppose proposals authorizing the creation of new classes of common stock with superior voting rights. We will generally oppose the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution and other rights. In addition, we will not support capitalization changes that add classes of stock with undefined voting rights or classes that may dilute the voting interests of existing shareholders. We support proposals to abolish voting caps and capitalization changes that eliminate other classes of stock and/or unequal voting rights.

Increase in Authorized Capital

The ability to raise capital is critical for companies to carry out strategy, to grow, and to achieve returns above their cost of capital. The approval of capital raising activities is fundamental to shareholders' ability to monitor returns and to ensure capital is deployed efficiently. We support capital increases that have sound business reasons and are not excessive relative to a company's existing capital base.

Pre-emption rights are a fundamental right for shareholders to protect their investment in a company. Where companies seek to issue new shares whilst disapplying pre-emption rights, we may vote against if such authorities are greater than 20 percent of the issued share capital. We may also vote against resolutions that seek authority to issue capital with pre-emption rights if the aggregate amount allowed seems excessive and is not justified by the board. Generally, we oppose capital issuance proposals greater than 100 percent of the issued share capital when the proceeds are not intended for a specific purpose.

Share Repurchase Programs

We typically support proposals to repurchase shares; however, there are exceptions in some cases. We do not support repurchases if the issuer does not clearly state the business purpose for the program, a definitive number of shares to be repurchased, the range of premium/discount to market price at which the company can repurchase shares, and the timeframe for the repurchase. We may vote against share repurchase requests that allow share repurchases during a takeover period.

Dividends

We generally support dividend payouts that constitute 30 percent or more of net income. We may vote against the dividend payouts if the dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation or the payout is excessive given the company's financial position. Particular attention will be paid to cases in which the payment may damage the company's long-term financial health.

Related-Party Transactions

Some companies in European markets have a controlled ownership structure and complex cross-shareholdings between subsidiaries and parent companies ("related companies"). Such structures may result in the prevalence of related-party transactions between the company and its various stakeholders, such as directors and management, subsidiaries and shareholders. In markets where shareholders are required to approve such transactions, we expect companies to provide details of the transaction, such as the nature, the value and the purpose of such a transaction. We also encourage independent directors to ratify such transactions. Further, we encourage companies to describe the level of independent board oversight and the approval process, including details of any independent valuations provided by financial advisors on related-party transactions.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Mergers or restructurings often involve proposals relating to reincorporation, restructurings, mergers, liquidation and other major changes to the corporation. Proposals will be supported if they are in the best interest of the shareholders, which is demonstrated by enhancing share value or improving the effectiveness of the company's operations. In general, provisions that are not viewed as financially sound or are thought to be destructive to shareholders' rights are not supported.

We will generally support transactions that maximize shareholder value. Some of the considerations include:

- · Offer premium
- Strategic rationale
- Board oversight of the process for the recommended transaction, including director and/or management conflicts of interest
- · Offers made at a premium and where there are no other higher bidders
- · Offers in which the secondary market price is substantially lower than the net asset value

We may vote against a transaction considering the following:

- Offers with potentially damaging consequences for minority shareholders because of illiquid stock
- Offers where we believe there is a reasonable prospect for an enhanced bid or other bidders
- The current market price of the security exceeds the bid price at the time of voting.

Anti-Takeover Measures

European markets have diverse regulations concerning the use of share issuances as takeover defenses, with legal restrictions lacking in some markets. We support the one-share, one-vote policy. For example, dual-class capital structures entrench certain shareholders and management, insulating them from possible takeovers. We oppose unlimited share issuance authorizations because they can be used as anti-takeover devices. They have the potential for substantial voting and earnings dilution. We also monitor the duration of time for authorities to issue shares, as well as whether there are restrictions and caps on multiple issuance authorities during the specified time periods. We oppose antitakeover defenses, such as authorities for the board when subject to a hostile takeover to issue warrants convertible into shares to existing shareholders.

Remuneration

Executive Pay

Despite the differences among the various types of plans and awards, there is a simple underlying philosophy that guides our analysis of executive pay: there should be a direct relationship between remuneration and company performance over the long term.

Shareholders should have the opportunity to assess whether pay structures and levels are aligned with business performance. When assessing remuneration reports, we consider factors such as adequate disclosure of remuneration elements, absolute and relative pay levels, peer selection and benchmarking, the mix of long-term and short-term incentives, alignment of pay structures with shareholder interests, corporate strategy and performance. We may oppose remuneration reports where pay seems misaligned with shareholders' interests. We may also vote against the re-election of members of the remuneration committee if we have serious concerns about remuneration practices and if the company has not been responsive to shareholder pressure to review its approach.

Equity Incentives Plans

We may not support proposals regarding equity-based incentive plans where insufficient information is provided on matters, including grant limits, performance metrics, performance and vesting periods, and overall dilution. Generally, we do not support options under such plans being issued at a discount to market price or plans that allow for retesting of performance metrics.

Non-Executive Director Pay

In European markets, proposals seeking shareholder approval for non-executive directors' fees are generally not controversial. We typically support resolutions regarding directors' fees unless disclosure is poor and we are unable to determine whether the fees are excessive relative to fees paid by comparable companies. We will evaluate any non-cash or performance-related pay to non-executive directors on a company-by-company basis.

Risk Management

We believe that risk management is a key function of the board, which is responsible for setting the overall risk appetite of a company and for providing oversight on the risk management process established by senior executives at a company. We allow boards to have discretion regarding the ways in which they provide oversight in this area. However, we expect companies to disclose how the board provides oversight on its risk management system and risk identification. Boards should also review existing and emerging risks that evolve in tandem with the political and economic landscape or as companies diversify or expand their operations into new areas.

As responsible stewards, we believe in the importance of effective risk management and oversight of issues that are material to a company. To effectively assess the risk of our clients' portfolios and the broader market, we expect our portfolio companies to manage risks and opportunities that are material and industry-specific and that have a demonstrated link to long-term value creation, and to provide high-quality disclosure of this process to shareholders.

Consistent with this perspective, we may seek to engage with our portfolio companies to better understand how their boards are overseeing risks and opportunities the company has deemed to be material to its business or operations. If we believe a company has failed to implement and communicate effective oversight of these risks, we may consider voting against the directors responsible.

Environmental and Social Issues

As a fiduciary, State Street Global Advisors takes a comprehensive approach to engaging with our portfolio companies about material environmental and social factors. Our Asset Stewardship program prioritization process allows us to proactively identify companies for engagement and voting in order to mitigate sustainability risks in our portfolio. Through engagement, we aim to build long-term relationships with the issuers in which we invest on behalf of our clients and to address a broad range of topics relating to the promotion of long-term shareholder value creation. When voting, we fundamentally consider whether the adoption of a shareholder proposal addressing an environmental or social topic material to the company would promote long-term shareholder value in the context of the company's existing practices and disclosures as well as existing market practice.

For more information on our approach to environmental and social issues, please see our Global Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines for Environmental and Social Factors, available at ssga.com/about-us/asset-stewardship.html.

About State Street Global Advisors

For four decades, State Street Global Advisors has served the world's governments, institutions and financial advisors. With a rigorous, risk-aware approach built on research, analysis and market-tested experience, we build from a breadth of index and active strategies to create cost-effective solutions. And, as pioneers in index, ETF, and ESG investing, we are always inventing new ways to invest. As a result, we have become the world's fourth-largest asset manager* with US \$3.48 trillion† under our care.

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Marketing communication

State Street Global Advisors Worldwide Entities

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^{*} Pensions & Investments Research Center, as of December 31, 2021.

[†] This figure is presented as of December 31, 2022 and includes approximately \$58.60 billion USD of assets with respect to SPDR products for which State Street Global Advisors Funds Distributors, LLC (SSGA FD) acts solely as the marketing agent. SSGA FD and State Street Global Advisors are affiliated. Please note all ALIM is unaudited

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