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**March 21, 2025**

Commentary

## Global Macro Policy Quarterly

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**Contact**

**Simona Mocuta**

Senior Economist

[simona\\_mocuta@ssga.com](mailto:simona_mocuta@ssga.com)

**Elliot Hentov, PhD**

Head, Policy Research

[elliott\\_hentov@ssga.com](mailto:elliott_hentov@ssga.com)

**Krishna Bhimavarapu**

Economist

[VenkataVamseaKrishna\\_Bhimavarapu@ssga.com](mailto:VenkataVamseaKrishna_Bhimavarapu@ssga.com)

**Amy Le, CFA**

Macro-Investment Strategist

[amy\\_le@ssga.com](mailto:amy_le@ssga.com)

**Vladimir Gorshkov**

Macro Policy Strategist

[vladimir\\_gorshkov@ssga.com](mailto:vladimir_gorshkov@ssga.com)

**Global Macro Highlights**

***Little to See, Much to Worry About***


If there was ever a time when we shouldn't rely too heavily on forecasts, it is now. If you were to simply look at Figure 1 below and walk away without further investigation, you could easily conclude that all is right with the global economy. You would be wrong. Admittedly, steady growth near trend is not a bad outcome. But what that chart doesn't tell you is that there is considerable turmoil brewing that has the potential to disrupt this appearance of calm in the months ahead.

So why not reflect those risks more visibly in the numbers? There are three reasons. First, because three months since our December update, we still grapple with considerable uncertainty around the "what", the "when", the "how", and the "how long" of incoming US policy changes. Secondly, because even as some risks grow (i.e., trade), progress elsewhere (deregulation in US, stimulus in China), offer some partial offsets. And thirdly, the German debt break deal is a genuinely positive development whose beneficial impact will be felt over time. This is why, even as we trimmed US, Canadian, and UK growth, the 2025 eurozone forecast is unchanged. We see meaningful further improvement in 2026.

Despite imminent risks of further escalation in trade tensions (see [More Storms Brewing: Are Tariffs on Europe Next?](#)), the big shift in German policymaking is to us the equally important macro story of the past quarter. It speaks to a narrowing of the US growth outperformance, which had been previously anticipated in 2024 but failed to materialize. Now, there is a powerful fundamental catalyst behind that expectation in 2025. It is too soon to give up on the US exceptionalism story (separate policy goals from policy tactics), but it may be time to believe in Europe once again.

Central bank expectations are unchanged. We expect another hike from the BoJ, and 75 bp worth of cuts from Fed, 100 from ECB, and 125 from the BoE for the year as a whole.

**Figure 1: Global Growth 2025: Little To See, Much To Worry About**



Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, IMF World Economic Outlook  
Updated as of 3/21/2025

**Summary of World Output<sup>1</sup> and Inflation<sup>2</sup> (Annual percent change)**

	Weight		History				Forecast	
	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
<b>World Growth</b>	100.0	-2.7	6.6	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.0	3.0
<b>Advanced Economies</b>	40.7	-4.0	6.0	2.9	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.5
US	15.0	-2.2	6.1	2.5	2.9	2.8	2.0	2.0
Euro area	11.9	-6.1	6.3	3.6	1.0	0.8	1.1	1.6
Germany	3.2	-4.4	3.6	1.5	-0.1	-0.2	0.8	2.0
France	2.3	-7.6	6.8	2.6	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2
Italy	1.9	-9.0	8.8	5.0	0.8	0.5	0.6	1.0
Japan	3.5	-4.2	2.8	0.9	1.5	0.1	1.2	0.8
UK	2.2	-10.3	8.6	4.8	0.4	0.9	1.1	1.3
Canada	1.4	-5.0	6.0	4.2	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.2
Australia	1.0	-2.0	5.4	4.1	2.1	1.0	2.2	2.6
<b>Developing Economies</b>	59.3	-1.8	7.0	4.0	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.0
China	18.7	2.0	9.2	3.1	5.4	5.0	4.8	4.5
<b>Advanced Economy Inflation</b>	40.7	0.7	3.1	7.3	4.6	2.6	2.4	2.0
US	15.0	1.3	4.7	8.0	4.1	3.0	2.8	2.2
Euro area	11.9	0.3	2.6	8.4	5.5	2.4	2.2	2.0
Germany	3.2	0.5	3.1	6.9	6.0	2.3	2.2	2.0
France	2.3	0.5	1.7	5.2	4.9	2.0	1.8	1.9
Italy	1.9	-0.1	1.9	8.2	5.7	1.1	1.7	1.7
Japan	3.5	0.0	-0.3	2.5	3.3	2.5	2.8	2.5
UK	2.2	0.9	2.6	9.1	7.4	2.6	3.0	2.6
Canada	1.4	0.7	3.4	6.8	3.9	2.4	2.8	2.2
Australia	1.0	0.9	2.9	6.6	5.6	3.2	2.4	2.8
<b>Developing Economies</b>	59.3	5.1	5.9	9.6	8.1	7.8	5.5	5.0
China	18.7	2.4	0.9	2.0	0.2	0.2	0.6	1.0
<b>Value of World Output (\$ trl)</b>								
At Market Exchange Rates		85.5	97.4	101.4	105.7	115.6	126.4	134.5
At Purchasing Power Parities		139.1	155.4	172.3	184.3	201.0	219.1	233.4

<sup>1</sup> Real GDP; <sup>2</sup> Consumer Price Inflation

Weight is the share of world GDP on a purchasing power parity basis ( IMF *World Economic Outlook*)

Historical data sources: Oxford Economics, IMF. Forecast: SSGA Global Macro and Policy Research

Politics and Geopolitics

**Ukraine Cease-Fire Prospects: How Much Will It Matter for Markets?**

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represented a global macro shock via higher commodity prices and a severe terms of trade hit for Europe. How much of a benefit would a pause or de-escalation of the war bring?

Some, but recent European equity and FX outperformance are only indirectly and partially related to Ukraine (via higher European defense spending). First of all, even the most optimistic outcomes do not foresee a stable peace. Observers will view any deal as a fragile ceasefire that does not justify immediate real money flows. Second, a complete restoration of economic links back to pre-2022 is unlikely, although there could be some gradual sanctions relief from the West and some return of Russian gas supply. However, these will be a fraction of pre-war activity. In 2021, over 40% of EU energy imports were from Russia, down to 18% in 2024 and presumably less this year after the closure of the last pipeline. Third, commodity prices are already relatively softish so further price declines will not be particularly stimulative. The main support here would be mainly via lower inflation and more room for accommodative monetary policy. All in all, these are indeed positive but with limited scope.

But shouldn’t the reduction or absence of armed conflict have positive spillover effects, at least in terms of sentiment and risk perception? This should be true but we do not see much room for risk premia compression. As a proxy, Figure 2 shows Polish 10-year government bond spread over Germany. Clearly, the war triggered a big expansion in risk premia, notably well before actual outbreak of war as markets factored in Russia risks. This lasted about a year after which spreads normalized not too far above pre-war averages. One could claim that a formal end of the Ukraine war could deliver additional spread compression, but we believe that to be limited.

**Figure 2: Limited Room For Further Spread Compression Here**



Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, Political Thermometer, Macrobond  
Updated as of 3/21/2025

In sum, political developments will not deliver a strong positive sentiment boost on their own. Instead, the paradoxical dynamic is that Russian success in framing the ceasefire conditions is actually more stimulative for Europe’s economy. The external threat forces a cohesive European response, which typically means stronger fiscal policy financed by joint mechanisms. Higher defense spending as well as funds for Ukraine reconstruction would all strengthen European industrial capacity and domestic demand. In this regard, a cease-fire may do more than continued warfare.

**Country Macro Highlights**

Please see individual country commentaries in respective sections below.


**US: Neither Invincible, Nor Broken**

In times of rapid change and conflicting signals, a sense of perspective is that much more important. Perceptions about the health of the US economy have swung dramatically since our last update. After a string of data disappointments and a dramatic decline in consumer sentiment in recent weeks, the sense of euphoria that permeated the end of Q4 has vanished. Within weeks, we seem to have swung from proclamations of apparent invincibility to worried questioning of whether the US economy is somehow broken. Neither is true.

So where do we stand? In many ways, not that far from where we were in December. The US economy ended 2024 on a very strong footing—unsustainably strong, in fact. The economy grew 2.8%, barely changed from 2.9% in 2023, with consumer spending growth actually accelerating slightly and contributing the lion’s share of the overall performance. Private fixed investment growth also picked up on account of residential construction which finally emerged from two years of deep contractions. Elsewhere, equipment investment grew at a steady pace, IP investment growth slowed modestly, and non-residential structures investment slowed sharply (but from a higher base). Trade was a persistent drag.

We expect growth to slow to 2.0% in 2025, a two-tenth downgrade relative to our December forecast. Much of this comes from household consumption, which slows from 2.8% to 2.2%, a notable downshift. What causes this? It is a combination of hard data (i.e., number of people, income) and soft data (sentiment). Admittedly, we were surprised by the extraordinary resilience in consumer spending last year, and we may yet be again, but factors weighing on consumption appear to be multiplying.

**Figure 3: The Most Important US Statistic**



Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, BLS  
 Updated as of 3/21/2025

First, immigration is undergoing an abrupt shift. We do not have a clear sense of how many deportations will actually take place this year (likely much fewer than people expect), but the data already show a dramatic reduction in new arrivals into the country. Even assuming steady per capita spending, this means slower growth in aggregate household consumption. Secondly, as excess savings wane, consumption starts to more closely align with income growth, specifically labor income. Labor income growth should moderate in line with slower payrolls expansion, which is why, despite the obsessive focus on tariffs, we believe the labor market and the unemployment rate are the most important statistics of 2025. We see the unemployment rate hitting 4.5% in Q4. Lastly, confidence matters and consumer confidence has plummeted lately amid tariff worries and DOGE actions. Even if temporary, this should lift precautionary savings and slow consumption.

Let us be clear. Household consumption growing 2.2% and real GDP growing 2.0% is not a recession. But it is a noticeable slowdown after two years of near-3.0% growth. There are non-trivial risks that the deceleration could be even more pronounced, but it is too soon to bet on that outcome.

At the core, we believe that despite the disruptive tactics, the policy goals of the US administration reflect a “play to win” mentality. This implies a degree of responsiveness to negative feedback that may be under-rated at the moment.

The bottom line is that risks to both sides of the Fed’s dual mandate have risen, which is why we maintain our call for three Fed cuts in 2025. This is now almost consensus, but it certainly was not so in January-February. Admittedly, the early deployment of tariffs delays the first cut from March (where we initially had it) to June. But, torn between managing a temporary increase in inflation due to tariffs and a potentially persistent labor market slowdown, we expect the Fed to reduce the degree of policy restrictiveness currently in place. We are a little more constructive on inflation than the Fed, as we see core PCE inflation averaging 2.6% y/y in Q4, versus the 2.8% indicated in the Fed’s March summary of economic projections.

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**Canada: BoC in a  
Tough Spot**

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Once again, tariffs cast a shadow over our macro forecasts. We still expect that most tariffs will be lifted relatively quickly but the trade relationship between the two countries is unlikely to fully return to 2024 levels. Support from domestic monetary easing will offset some of the trade uncertainty but slowing population growth and weaker US demand are notable headwinds. We have downgraded our 2025 growth forecast by 0.3% to 1.0%.

Q1 GDP growth is likely to be above trend due to strong consumer spending boosted by GST holidays and front-loading of exports to the US. However, momentum will fade in Q2.

We now assume that a high level of US tariffs stays in place for six months, before being gradually scaled back through negotiations. We think that tariffs targeted to specific areas such as steel and aluminium as well as some agricultural products are unlikely to be removed in the short term. While Canada has announced measures to mitigate the impact of tariffs (changes to the work-share program for

affected industries, financial programs run by the EDC, BDC and Farm Credit Canada, etc.) the economy will still likely enter a recession this year.

**Figure 4: Canada's Exports in 2024**



Job growth almost stagnated in February following a string of several strong readings. Labor demand has softened, and wage growth has slowed, although it remains elevated around 4.0% y/y. The unemployment rate was steady at 6.6% in February, having peaked at 6.9% in November. As labor demand will continue to weaken, we expect the unemployment rate to rise later this year although the extent of the increase will likely be capped by slowing population growth.

Housing activity strengthened in late 2024, supported by lower interest rates and mortgage rule changes but home sales have softened again recently. Given the heightened uncertainty and weaker Loonie, these pressure will likely persist. We expect residential investment to decline throughout the year.

As the sales tax holiday ended, headline inflation rose more than expected to 2.6% y/y, up from 1.9% in January. Importantly, the three-month annualized trend in core inflation has been tracking above 3%, implying that core inflation will increase further. We see headline inflation averaging 2.8% in 2025 and 2.2% in 2026. This puts the Bank of Canada (BoC) in a tough spot. So far, the BoC has cut 225 bp since June 2024, but there is a limit on how far the bank can go. We expect the bank will provide two more rate cuts in its next two interest rate meetings, bringing the policy rate to 2.25%, the low end of its neutral rate range.

**UK: Delayed But Faster Rate Cuts?**

We downgraded the 2025 real GDP growth forecast from 1.5% to 1.1%, reflecting subdued economic activity in Q1 and the softening forward-looking data, especially those related to the job market.


After stagnating in Q3, the economy managed a modest growth of 0.1% in Q4 and headed into 2025 in a cautious mode due to the impact of the October Budget and higher yields earlier this year. We expect growth to pick up somewhat in coming

months, boosted by public spending. However, given likely deterioration in labor market in near term, that momentum could fade towards the summer.

Private sector employment has already declined throughout 2024, albeit by only 0.9%. Although redundancy levels are low, there is a major risk they will rise after the increase in employer national insurance contributions (NICs) in April. Moreover, the public sector’s support for employment will soon fade as the Chancellor is expected to announce big spending cuts in the spring statement.

We have revised up our 2025 forecasts for headline inflation by 0.6 percentage points to 3.0% on average, in consideration of rising energy and water bills, rebound in airfare prices, and trade uncertainty. Higher employer NICs will also add to inflationary pressures but the impact is likely to be modest given tepid consumer spending. In addition, deterioration in labor market will help lower wage growth and offset some increase in inflation. We expect that the headline CPI to oscillate around 3% for much of this year and peak at 3.5% later this year.

**Figure 5: The BoE Is Behind The Curve**



Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, Fed, ECB, BoE  
Updated as of 3/21/2025

Currently, the policy rate remains at a high level of 4.5% but the BoE still tied to gradual approach due to its concern on weak supply-side and renewed inflation. As fiscal space is limited, monetary policy seems to be the only option for the economy to thrive. That means the BoE is likely to end up delivering a delayed but deeper easing cycle. We continue to expect that the policy rate will reach 3.5% by year end.




**Eurozone: The Impossible Has Come to Pass!**

Often in life, progress emerges out of discomfort. The same can be said about what has recently transpired on the EU—and especially, German—macro policy front. Last December, we wrote that “2024 was a major election year globally; 2025 will be the year of adjusting to policy outcomes following those elections. For Europe, 2025 may matter even more. The need is clear: the region as a whole must do more to help itself. Will its political system rise to the occasion, or is economic pain still deemed not serious enough?”

There is not much point in debating whether it was the German political system that drove the change or whether this was primarily a spillover effect from US elections (we lean towards the second interpretation). What matters is the outcome: the EU as a whole and Germany in particular are stepping up the proactive deployment of fiscal policy to an extent not seen since the dark days of Covid. Furthermore, these actions are more fundamental and longer lasting in nature: it is not merely about temporarily working around the rules, but about actually changing the rules.

**Figure 6: Is Germany's "Lost Decade" Ending At Last?**



Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, Eurostat, Istat, DESTATIS, INE, ELSTAT  
Updated as of 3/21/2025

Germany pushed through a major reform of its debt break, including:

- a) doubling the allowable structural deficit from 0.35% to 0.7% of GDP
- b) excluding all defense spending in excess of 1.0% of GDP from the debt break calculations, and
- c) a new infrastructure fund totaling €500 billion deployable over 12 years, €100 billion of which earmarked for green investments

Given that German nominal GDP stood at €4.3 trillion in 2024, these numbers are large enough to materially alter the likely trajectory of economic growth over the medium term, possibly boosting German GDP by over 1.0 percentage points per year at the peak. Admittedly, that boost will not arrive immediately, there will be some leakage overseas, and the relative impact will diminish over time as the economy

grows. Nonetheless, these are not pie in the sky scenarios, they are realistic probabilities. And so, we choose to focus on the key message: these changes will make the German economy stronger, and a stronger German economy is good for both Europe and the world.

A little ironically in light of the above, our German and eurozone growth forecast for 2025 have not changed. The main reason is that we had already worked under the assumption that some material shift to policy will occur, out of necessity. The second is that even as the domestic policy backdrop has improved dramatically, disbursements will not be immediate and risks on the trade front have intensified. At 0.8%, our 2025 German GDP growth is considerably above consensus and rests to a large extent on the view that lower interest rates and these impending policy changes can help boost consumer and business sentiment enough to lift consumption in fairly short order. We see German growth picking up materially to 2.0% in 2026.

Regional growth follows the German pattern but not the magnitude. The room for improvement is much less precisely because the rest of the Eurozone has fared much better than Germany in recent years. This therefore, is very much a story of Germany catching up, rather than the whole region experiencing a similarly transformative upgrade. To turn a well known phrase around—this is a big step for Germany but a smaller step for the world.


Our ECB expectations have not changed. In December, we considered whether to stick to four cuts in 2025 or add more, but we decided to stick to four. In light of new developments, that looks like the right call. Hence, we look for the ECB to cut twice more (June and September) and then stop with no further cuts in 2026.

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### **Japan: A Stitch in Time**

The Japanese economy is at a critical juncture where the Bank of Japan (BoJ) will find it difficult choosing between raising rates to control inflation or staying put due to rising risks to growth. We think the Bank would be better off to act preemptively and deliver on a hike that they have been guiding markets this year.

This is because we see inflation as a critical issue in Japan today and worry that it might self-perpetuate through higher inflation expectations. 53.5% consumers surveyed by the Cabinet Office in February opined that prices would rise 5.0% or more over the next year, the highest since June 2023. Meanwhile, food prices have been rising due to combination of hot weather temperatures and panic buying but we also think inflation expectations are contributing (figure 3). Food prices may keep rising over the next year and could eventually lift overall inflation. The BoJ core (excluding fresh food and energy) rose 2.6% in February, and up from 1.9% in July last year. Although the recently waived high school tuition fee would soften prices, we see CPI averaging 2.8% y/y this year and 2.5% in 2026. There may not be runaway inflation, but the risk persistently high inflation has risen.

**Figure 7: Rising Inflation Expectations In Japan**

Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, SBJ, CAO, MAFF  
Updated as of 3/21/2025

At the same time, headwinds to growth are increasing. The possibility of higher tariffs on Japanese (auto) exports to the US could shave 0.2-0.5 pts off growth in 2025, but we are also optimistic that some relief may be provided by President Trump subsequently. Capital expenditures may also be affected on higher uncertainty; we have lowered its growth in 2025 and see it rising back next year. These headwinds are slightly balanced by better wage growth, the second round results of this year's *shunto* negotiations resulted in an average raise of 5.40%, down 0.06 pp from the first. This result would still be higher than the last year's and help support domestic demand. Hence, growth in 2025 may eventually come at our December forecast of 1.2% y/y before easing to 0.8% next year.

All this means the BoJ would be caught between a rock and a hard place over the next two years. However, as markets gain clarity on global soft-landing over the next few months, we expect the BoJ to get more confident on their upward policy path.

Nonetheless, the BoJ stood pat in March with intact guidance while acknowledging the risks to growth. Governor Ueda expressed optimism that the economy may withstand the impact from tariffs and that the Bank may express it in the Outlook Report, due to be released in May. This gives the impression that under a goldilocks scenario, the Bank may frontload the next hike, a wise strategy in our opinion. We however see a higher probability in June, which is our base case. We then expect two more hikes in 2026, taking the policy rate to 1.25%.

We see higher odds for the BoJ falling behind on their inflation mandate rather than a growth slowdown, hence the rate expectations above. In a risk scenario, exports could severely underperform, posing downside risk to our 2025 growth forecast and causing the policy rate could peak at 0.75%. However, a stitch in time (a rate hike) saves nine (reduces the risk of runaway inflation).

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**Australia: Recovery  
Time**

The Australian economy expanded 1.3% y/y in Q4 2024, in line with expectations of a soft recovery from hereon. Furthermore, inflation is slowing as expected and is tracking at around 2.5%, the mid-point of the Reserve Bank of Australia's (RBA) target band. This should allow the Bank to deliver two more rate cuts this year, taking the cash rate to 3.60% by December.

While Australia seems increasingly less likely to secure an exception from President Trump's reciprocal tariffs, we continue to see little impact on the economy. However, China is more important from Australia's perspective, and the encouraging developments on stimulus in China are important tailwinds.

We expect Australia's GDP growth to average 2.2% y/y and 2.6% in 2025 and 2026 respectively. While the 2026 number debuts in this edition, our 2025 forecast is unchanged. We continue to expect domestic consumption to gradually improve towards the end of the year and be well supported by two more rate cuts. However, exports pose a meaningful risk to the outlook even if the adjustments we made could lift near term growth prospects.

A reprieve in the context of the last two years is that inflation is now clearly easing into the RBA's target band. The leading indicators we track show no material risks currently, but we suspect that may change next year. While we maintain our 2.4% y/y average rise in headline CPI this year, we see it rising to 2.8% in 2026 on stronger aggregate demand. Our forecasts not only factor in a continuation of energy subsidies but also a modest impact from the higher tariffs.


The labor market has been a blessing in disguise as it supported incomes of Australians through the 2024 slowdown. Unexpectedly though, the economy lost 52.8k jobs in February. The data is a useful reminder that idiosyncrasis still exist in the labor market despite a general understanding of its strength. February's decline was led by fewer older workers returning to work and more of them retiring, but the unemployment rate remained at 4.1% as the participation rate eased sharply to 66.8%, four-tenths lower than January's all time high. This was also commensurated by a 0.4% decline in the hours worked. Unless this becomes a trend (which is unlikely), the RBA might not take a signal from this data. We now expect the unemployment rate would remain between 4.1%-4.5% in the forecast horizon. The labor market will remain tight with participation rate near their current high level, but seasonal patterns and unclear data pose risks.

Given the above outlook, the RBA is likely to deliver measured monetary easing over the forecast horizon. We expect two more cuts this year after the first rate cut in February. The conviction for easing beyond that is fairly low, meaning that the RBA is more likely to sit on the fence or deliver modest tightening if inflation rises in 2026 on higher aggregate demand stemming from sustained labor market strength.

We are cognizant of the potential for US reciprocal tariffs impacting global sentiment (and then growth), but at the same time we have reasonable conviction that the Australian economy might be insulated from impact, given that their trade exposure to the US is quite small. However, if tariffs lead to a material slowdown in the global economy, Australia's growth would surprise to the downside and the RBA may have to move into a more aggressive easing stance.

Australian federal elections must be conducted before May 17 and recent surveys tip the opposing coalition led by the Liberal National Party to a slight advantage. The high cost of living is unsurprisingly the the top voter concerns. However, another topic up for debate is the need to diversify the country’s growth drivers from resource exports to more sustainable drivers such as domestic manufacturing, whose share in Australia’s output has declined dramatically (Figure 8) over the last 50 years. These changes cannot happen overnight but are critical in the context of today’s uncertain global environment.

**Figure 8: Industry Share Of Australian Output**



Sources: Macrobond, SSGA Economics, ABS  
Updated as of 3/21/2025

**Week in Review**

Our summary of the key global data releases from the past week.

Country	Release (Date, format)	Consensus	Actual	Last	Comments
<b>Monday, March 17</b>					
US	Empire Manufacturing (Mar)	-1.9	-20	5.7	Downtrend continues.
US	Retail Sales Advance (Feb, m/m)	0.6%	0.2%	-1.2% (↓)	Core sales were robust.
<b>Tuesday, March 18</b>					
US	Housing Starts (Feb, thous)	1,385	1,501	1,350 (↓)	Better.
CA	CPI (Feb, y/y)	2.2%	2.6%	1.9%	Well above expectations.
GE	ZEW Survey Expectations (Mar)	48.3	51.6	26.0	Poised to break higher?
JN	Core Machine Orders (Jan, m/m)	-0.1%	-3.5%	-0.8% (↑)	Need to improve.
JN	Tertiary Industry Index (Jan, m/m)	-0.1%	-0.3%	0.4% (↑)	Need to improve.
<b>Wednesday, March 19</b>					
US	FOMC Rate Decision (Upper Bound)	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%	Wait and see while slowing QT.
JN	BOJ Target Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	We see terminal policy rate at 1.25% in 2026.
JN	Industrial Production (Jan, m/m, final)	n/a	-1.1%	-0.2%	Need to improve, but limited outlook currently.
<b>Thursday, March 20</b>					
US	Leading Index (Feb)	-0.2%	-0.3%	-0.2% (↑)	Pullback continues.
US	Existing Home Sales (Feb, m/m)	-3.2%	4.2%	-4.7% (↑)	Pleasant surprise.
UK	Unemployment Rate (Feb)	n/a	4.4%	4.4%	Likely to increase further.
UK	Bank of England Bank Rate	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	MPC at crossroads.
JN	Natl CPI (Feb, y/y)	3.5%	3.7%	4.0%	Inflation is Japan's biggest problem today.
AU	Unemployment Rate (Feb)	4.1%	4.1%	4.1%	Employment fell but labor market remains tight.
<b>Friday, March 21</b>					
No major data releases					

Source: for data, Bloomberg®; for commentary, SSGA Economics.

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\* Pensions & Investments Research Center, as of December 31, 2023.

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