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Europe’s underpriced tail risk How the war in Ukraine is widening geopolitical risks for European markets

As the war in Ukraine increasingly spills into Europe, investors may be underpricing the potential impact of geopolitical escalation, particularly on CEE assets.

Macro Policy Strategist
Market Positioning, Global Fiduciary Solutions

In 2022, Ukraine was a first-order driver of markets. Since then, investors have largely priced the war as a contained conflict. But as it increasingly spills into Europe, that assumption leaves investors exposed to risks that markets are not adequately pricing, particularly in Central and Eastern European assets (CEE).

The Ukraine war grinds on

The war is approaching its fifth year, yet the gap between the two sides remains wide. The terms currently under discussion do not envision simply ending the war along current lines, as some may believe. Moscow continues to demand substantial concessions from Ukraine on territory, domestic politics, and foreign orientation. For Ukraine, these issues are existential, making such concessions difficult to accept. Both sides continue to believe that fighting on can improve their eventual settlement. A durable peace therefore remains elusive. For Europe, this dynamic matters: the longer the war continues, the greater Russia’s incentive to undermine the external support that enables Ukraine to keep fighting.

Europe is part of the battlefield

Europe has been part of the conflict since the beginning. European funding, weapons, intelligence, logistics, and industrial capacity are critical to Ukraine's ability to sustain the war. Russia therefore has a clear incentive to weaken European support. But NATO deterrence makes direct military confrontation exceptionally risky.

Russia’s strategy is to raise the cost of supporting Ukraine while staying below the threshold likely to trigger a decisive response. It is a strategy of attrition and experimentation. Military pressure, sabotage, cyberattacks, espionage, political interference, disinformation, and economic coercion raise costs, create uncertainty, and test European resolve.

The strategy is iterative. Where retaliation is limited, Russia learns how much further it may be able to go. The increase in Russia-linked incidents in Europe since 2022 suggests that this process is already underway (Figure 1). More concerningly, recent incidents indicate a growing willingness to risk physical damage and casualties.

Russian energy remains a strategic lever

Energy provides another potential channel of pressure. Europe has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian energy since 2022, but it has not eliminated it. Russian gas still accounts for around 15% of Europe’s gas imports (Figure 2). In normal market conditions, that exposure may appear manageable. In a stressed energy system, however, the marginal value of those remaining flows can rise sharply.

European buyers of natural gas slowed their purchases over the summer in the expectation that the war in Iran would end and pressure on gas supplies would ease. With the Iran conflict still unresolved, Europe is ending the year with inventories lower than historical levels and the global LNG market still tight. A disruption or withdrawal of the remaining Russian flows into an already tight market could push European gas and power prices higher.

Tail risk could trigger nonlinear repricing

The danger to investors is twofold. The first is direct economic damage. Most individual incidents have little macroeconomic impact, even though costs to individual companies can be substantial. But as attempts at disruption grow in frequency and severity, so does the likelihood that one eventually succeeds on a materially significant scale, for example, through a successful attack on transport, communications, energy, or other critical infrastructure.

The second risk is less direct but potentially more important: nonlinear repricing. A sufficiently serious attack could force investors to reassess the full range of geopolitical outcomes at once, raising the risk premium demanded for holding exposed European assets. The resulting market move could therefore be much larger than the immediate economic damage would imply.

Markets largely price the war as contained

What is striking is how difficult it is to find evidence of geopolitical risk in European markets. The Polish zloty provides a useful case study. Poland’s proximity to the conflict made zloty a vulnerable asset; it depreciated sharply following Russia's invasion in 2022. Given that experience, one might expect greater implied volatility for the PLN itself or a higher price for insurance against PLN depreciation, particularly as Europe increasingly finds itself a target.

But whichever way we look at it, the premium is hard to find. Volatility in the Polish zloty is well below historical norms, while the cost of protecting against a sharp depreciation is also unusually low (Figure 3). The same pattern holds for the Hungarian forint and Czech koruna, suggesting that investors are under-pricing geopolitical risks across the region, rather than in Poland alone.

What underpriced risk means for investors

  • There is limited upside embedded in CEE asset prices from simply assuming an end to the war. Much of the repricing associated with eventual peace has already taken place.
  • Geopolitical risks appear underpriced. However, escalation can remain gradual, making options rather than outright short positions more attractive for insuring against this risk. Far out-of-the-money options can provide exposure to a large regional repricing while limiting carry cost.
  • CEE volatility itself appears underpriced. If the range of potential geopolitical outcomes has widened, demand for protection against large market moves should arguably be higher than current option pricing suggests.
  • European gas retains upside risk. A combination of low inventories, tight LNG markets, and a cold winter could give Russia an opportunity to withdraw supply, potentially causing a disproportionate increase in European gas and electricity prices.

The rising frequency of Russia-linked incidents shows that escalation is already underway, yet investor compensation for bearing that risk remains surprisingly limited.

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